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Executive Summary 
During the Great Recession, millions of Americans found themselves out of work. The federal 
government’s response to the large increase in unemployment was to extend the number of 
weeks of unemployment insurance an individual may collect while unemployed. It was during 
this time that the nation also saw a dramatic rise in average unemployment duration to record 
levels. This paper seeks to determine whether the federal benefit increase was a contributing 
factor to the sharp rise in unemployment duration. The analysis found that extending 
unemployment benefits increased unemployment duration spells. When examining all duration 
spells, each additional week of unemployment benefits resulted in a 0.08 week increase in 
unemployment duration. There was evidence of a larger impact on the long-term unemployed. 
For every additional week of unemployment benefits, unemployment duration increased by 0.16 
weeks for those individuals who had been unemployed at least 26 weeks.  
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1 Introduction 
The average unemployment duration in the United States rose dramatically during the Great 
Recession, and remained at high levels after the recession had ended. The federal government 
responded to this crisis by extending the number of weeks of unemployment insurance benefits 
an unemployed individual is able to receive up to 99 weeks (Center on Budget and Policy 
Priorities, 2013). In 2006 the average maximum weeks of UI benefits available was about 26 
weeks, and highest average maximum was just over 91 weeks in 2011. The benefit extension 
lasted throughout the Great Recession and just recently expired in December of 2013. This paper 
investigates whether the federal benefit increase was a contributing factor to the rise in 
unemployment duration. The maximum number of weeks of unemployment insurance an 
individual is eligible to receive can affect how long that person stays unemployed. If they were 
eligible for 99 weeks of benefits, they may have stayed unemployed longer than if they were 
eligible for only 26 weeks of benefits. This is an argument of moral hazard which says that 
having access to additional weeks of benefits can reduce the incentive to find work after 
becoming unemployed. If moral hazard is a problem, individuals are choosing to stay 
unemployed rather than return to work. The moral hazard argument will be explored in more 
detail later in the paper. 
 
This paper will examine recent levels of unemployment duration and estimate the impacts 
different factors had on the increase in duration spells. The analysis relies on state differences in 
unemployment benefit eligibility to determine the impact of additional weeks of benefits on 
duration spells. The analysis found that extending unemployment benefits increased 
unemployment duration spells. When examining all duration spells, each additional week of 
4 
 
unemployment benefits resulted in a 0.08 week increase in unemployment duration. There was 
evidence of a larger impact on the long-term unemployed. For every additional week of 
unemployment benefits, unemployment duration increased by 0.16 weeks for those individuals 
who have been unemployed at least 26 weeks. Based on the increase in the average maximum 
weeks of UI benefits (about 65 weeks) as a result of the benefit extension, duration spells 
increased by about 5.26 weeks and increased duration spells for the long-term unemployed by 
about 10.52 weeks.
1
   
2 Background: Unemployment Insurance 
Unemployment Insurance (UI) is a social insurance program that provides a safety net for 
regularly employed workers who become unemployed through no fault of their own, and meet 
certain eligibility requirements (DOL, 2013).  Each state operates its own unemployment 
insurance program and sets eligibility requirements, within federal guidelines. Unemployment 
benefits are calculated based on a formula that factors in an individual’s wages from the previous 
four quarters, up to a certain level. Standard benefits provide a maximum 26 weeks of benefits to 
an eligible unemployed worker. To remain eligible for the program an individual must 
demonstrate he or she is continuing to actively seek new employment. 
2.1 Funding 
The benefits individuals receive from the UI program are directly funded through state payroll 
taxes paid by employers on behalf of their employees. Not all wages are taxed; the federal 
government requires that all states tax at least the first $7,000 each employee earns annually. 
Most states have a larger taxable wage base, ranging from the minimum $7,000 up to the high of 
$41,300 in Washington (American Payroll Association, 2014). Even though employers directly 
                                                             
1 Prior to the Great Recession the average maximum amount of UI available was just under 26 weeks. The average 
maximum peaked in 2011 at just over 91 weeks. Taking the difference resulted in an increase of about 65 weeks in 
the maximum weeks of UI benefits.  
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pay the tax, economists generally assume that it is the employees who bear a greater burden of 
the tax (CBO, 2012, p. 23).  The idea is that the dollars spent on the tax would otherwise have 
been used for employee wages. In effect, the cost of the UI program is passed on to currently 
employed workers. 
 
In addition to the state payroll tax, the federal government also levies a tax on employers to 
support state UI programs through the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA) (Whittaker & 
Isaacs, 2014). The tax is 0.6 percent on the first $7,000 each employee earns annually (Stone & 
Chen, 2013). As a part of the Social Security Act of 1935, the federal government agreed to take 
on a role to support UI. The act states that the federal government will appropriate monies: 
“For the purpose of assisting the States in the administration of their unemployment 
compensation laws…” (The Social Security Act of 1935) 
Regarding payments made by the federal government to the states: 
“The Board shall from time to time certify to the Secretary of the Treasury for payment to 
each State which has an unemployment compensation law approved by the Board under 
Title IX, such amounts as the Board determines to be necessary for the proper 
administration of such law during the fiscal year in which such payment is to be made.” 
(The Social Security Act of 1935) 
The FUTA tax funds the administration of the state programs as well as the extended benefit 
programs and provides a fund from which states can borrow in order to pay regular UI benefits if 
necessary. 
2.2 Positive outcomes 
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Unemployment Insurance is a very beneficial public program not only for unemployed 
individuals but it also has positive effects for the larger economy as well (Elmendorf, 2011). For 
individuals, UI reduces the stress of losing a job by providing financial support for an 
unemployed worker and his or her family. There are many workers and their families who would 
fall into poverty without benefits from UI. In 2010 alone 3.2 million people were kept out of 
poverty by receiving unemployment benefits (Council of Economic Advisers, 2011). Losing a 
job can take a large negative toll on a person’s life, beyond the financial impacts; there are 
negative psychological effects as well as negative outcomes to a person’s health and well-being 
(American Psychological Association, 2014). UI cannot solve all of these problems but it eases 
the burden by providing financial assistance.  
 
In addition to the individual level benefits, UI acts as an economic stabilizer during recessionary 
times by providing money to unemployed individuals who have lost their primary source of 
income. Most out of work individuals would normally make large cuts in their spending habits. 
Receiving UI mitigates those cut backs and helps smooth consumer consumption during a period 
of financial uncertainty. Gruber (1994) estimates that the average fall in consumption would be 
three times higher without a UI program than the fall in consumption with UI present. Moody’s 
Analytics found that every dollar provided in unemployment benefits resulted in $1.55 spent in 
the economy, creating a multiplier effect (Green, 2013).  The boost provided by the influx of 
cash into the economy through UI benefits helps to increase consumer demand and UI has 
consistently been one of the most effective policies at generating economic growth by providing 
a boost to demand (Elmendorf, 2011).  
2.3 Extending Benefits 
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During economic downturns, unemployment benefits can be extended through two different 
programs, both of which generally only occur during times of high unemployment. Both 
programs only extend the number of weeks of benefits.  Neither program has any effect on the 
dollar value of benefits an individual receives.  
 
Extended Benefits (EB) is a joint federal-state program that started in 1970. State participation in 
the program is voluntary and eligibility is determined by state level unemployment rates. Two 
different scenarios trigger a state to provide EB. The first is if  a state’s unemployment rate 
reaches 6%, and the second is if  the state’s unemployment rate both reaches 5% and is at least 
20% higher than the state’s unemployment rate at any time during the last three years.  If either 
occurs, then UI benefits are extended to a maximum of either 13 or 20 weeks, depending on state 
preferences and economic conditions (see Table 1). The Federal government covers half the cost 
of the additional benefits provided through the FUTA tax, although during the Great Recession 
the federal government covered all costs of EB. An eligible unemployed worker must first 
exhaust the standard 26 weeks of benefits before he or she can receive extended benefits. Once 
the unemployment rate falls below the trigger levels, benefits return to the standard 26 weeks 
(Council of Economic Advisers, 2011). 
 
UI benefits can also be extended during recessionary times through temporary, federally 
administered programs. The most recent was the Emergency Unemployment Compensation 
(EUC), passed on June 30, 2008 in response to the Great Recession. EUC does not have an 
automatic trigger like the EB program does. Rather the federal government determines how the 
EUC will be implemented. EUC is funded by the federal government’s payroll tax levy on 
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employers. EUC is comprised of separate tiers, each of which provides additional weeks of UI 
based on state unemployment levels (see Tables 1 and 2).  Individuals in states where EUC 
benefits are in effect must first exhaust all regular and any extended state-sponsored benefits 
before collecting benefits from EUC.  Each tier of benefits within EUC must also be exhausted 
before moving onto the next tier.  
2.4 Current debate 
When EUC expired in December 2013, about 1.3 million unemployed Americans saw their 
benefits end and about 4.9 million unemployed individuals received fewer weeks of benefits. 
Currently the federal government must decide whether to refund EUC and restore the extended 
UI benefits. Refunding EUC has become a highly debated issue.   
 
Supporters of refunding EUC want to first and foremost continue to provide financial support to 
unemployed workers. They believe it is important to provide financial support to a vulnerable 
population. If benefits were not extended and unemployed workers became discouraged and 
dropped out of the labor force, the unemployment rate would decrease but it would be a false 
indication of improvement in the labor market. Continuing EUC would provide additional 
benefits to these discouraged workers and keep them from dropping out of the labor force. A 
final argument for continuing the EUC program is the weak job market. With very few available 
jobs, removing UI benefits would put many families in a very desperate financial position.  
 
Those against further extending benefits point to the high costs of the program and the financial 
pressure it will place on those still employed as well as employers if UI payroll taxes are raised. 
With such a large number of individuals still unemployed (and not paying the UI payroll tax) 
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there are fewer workers bearing a greater share of the tax burden in order to fund the program. 
States who need to borrow from the federal government in order to pay UI benefits are required 
to repay the loan in two years. The federal government, in order to recoup loans, raised federal 
UI payroll tax rates on states unable to repay in time, 18 states as of 2012 (Stone & Chen, 2013; 
ADP, 2012). Californian employers have seen their federal payroll taxes increase as the state’s 
UI trust fund has a deficit of $9 billion (State of California, 2013).  
 
Another argument against EUC is that unemployment insurance, especially extending benefits, 
can result in higher unemployment and longer unemployment duration. The following section 
will expand on this argument as well as explore some other theories that have led to the dramatic 
rise in unemployment duration. 
3 Theory 
Unemployment duration in the United States has been on the rise. As Figure 1 shows, since 1967 
there has been a steady upward trend. That trend was broken during the Great Recession when 
both mean and median duration levels spiked to their highest levels in the post-WWII era 
(Valletta & Kuang, 2012).  
 
Long-term unemployment, defined by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) as being unemployed 
for more than 26 weeks, became a serious problem during the Great Recession and is still a 
problem today. Figure 2 shows that the number of individuals who have been unemployed for 
more than 26 weeks has become a greater portion of the total unemployed population and those 
proportions have held steady post-recession. As of February 2014, nearly 3.9 million Americans 
have been unemployed for more than 26 weeks, representing 37 percent of the total number of 
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unemployed individuals (BLS, 2014a). For more recent data on unemployment duration from the 
BLS see Tables 3 and 4. 
 
The negative ramifications of unemployment are only exacerbated as unemployment duration 
increases. Although there are many causes of unemployment duration, the weak/inefficient labor 
market, costs to employers, the income effect and moral hazard will be discussed here, with the 
latter being the main focus of the paper. 
3.1 Moral Hazard 
Insurance, of any kind, changes the probability or size of perceived loss. Moral hazard is the idea 
that individuals will take on greater risk when the cost of that risk is either reduced or borne 
entirely by a separate party, often insurance providers. Otherwise, individuals would not engage 
in “risky” behavior if they did not have access to insurance because the personal costs would be 
too large. A key to moral hazard is that providers of insurance do not have perfect information on 
individuals and cannot directly observe the effort the recipient expends to minimize his or her 
own risk.  
 
When an individual loses his or her job, in the absence of UI, the primary source of income for 
that individual is gone. This increases financial risk, and if that individual does not receive UI, he 
or she bears the entire cost of the risk. In this case, the unemployed individual will try to return 
to work as quickly as he or she can in order to begin generating income again and lower his or 
her financial risk. 
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The scenario changes for unemployed workers who receive UI. Unemployment benefits lower 
the cost of losing a job, as the cost of the financial risk of becoming unemployed is no longer 
solely paid by the unemployed individual. There is now less risk to becoming unemployed since 
part of the cost of becoming unemployed is now paid by another party: an incentive is created for 
unemployed workers to delay returning to work.  
 
Moral hazard is often thought of as “taking advantage of the system” by collecting benefits when 
a person could return to work. Therefore, it could be viewed by some individuals   as getting paid 
not to work. However, these views are not shared by all UI recipients. For many, UI is a safety 
net that provides the time and security to search for the “right” job. Yet, they are not cognizant of 
the possibility that by taking the time to find the “right” job they are possibly 'taking advantage' 
of extended unemployment benefits. 
 
In addition to reducing job search effort, the extension of UI can also provide an incentive to 
continue searching for employment for individuals whose benefits were close to expiration. 
Those individual, instead of running out of benefits and being forced to either return to work or 
leave the labor force, can now continue to receive UI benefits and search for jobs.  (Rothstein, 
2011). However, Rothstein (2011) also points out that extending UI can also have the negative 
effect of increasing unemployment by encouraging discouraged workers to re-enter the labor 
force (and be counted among the unemployed) to collect benefits. 
 
If the potential for moral hazard is inherent to any insurance program, then extending that 
program can increase the potential for greater moral hazard. Moral hazard can become a 
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significant problem for social programs by making them inefficient through increased 
participation by individuals who do not necessarily need the support. In the case of UI, moral 
hazard not only raises the costs of the program through increasing benefits, but it can also create 
an incentive for people to not work. 
3.2 The Income Effect 
While moral hazard from increases in UI benefits has traditionally been accepted by many 
researchers as a cause for unemployment duration increases, it is not the only explanation. Chetty 
(2005) argues that increases in unemployment duration are the result of both an income effect 
and a substitution effect (moral hazard). Chetty presents his interpretation of the moral hazard 
effect as follows: providing UI benefits lowers the price of leisure relative to the price of 
working, which will result in an individual “consuming” more leisure time, because leisure is 
now cheaper. The cost of not working (lost wages) is not as high because of the UI benefits, and 
will result in individuals working less. Unemployed individuals are substituting work for more 
leisure, resulting in moral hazard and increased unemployment duration.  
 
Chetty argues that unemployment duration is impacted by an income effect, stemming from 
consumer liquidity levels, in addition to a substitution effect (moral hazard).  The impact of the 
income effect, according to Chetty, can be much larger than the effect of moral hazard. In order 
to consume goods individuals need to have cash on hand; if they are unemployed they have less 
income and less liquidity. UI benefits provide unemployed individuals with income which allows 
them to continue to raise their consumption while not working. Receiving UI benefits reduces 
the urgency for unemployed individuals to find work because they are not facing a financial 
crisis. When unemployed individuals are not motivated to quickly find work their unemployment 
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duration will increase. The effect of receiving income from UI, compared to not receiving it, 
results in an increase of unemployment duration. Details on Chetty’s findings will be discussed 
in section 4.  
3.3 Weak Job Market 
The largest cause of increases in unemployment duration is a weak job market (Valletta & 
Kuang, 2012). During recessionary times, as the economy contracts, companies will hire fewer 
workers due to slowdowns in consumer consumption which result in lower levels of production. 
With fewer goods and services to produce, firms will reduce staff to save costs. Until 
consumption starts to increase, firms have no reason to hire back workers. As the demand for 
labor continues to remain low, there will be many individuals chasing few jobs. Low numbers of 
job openings will result in unemployed workers remaining unemployed longer because there are 
not enough available jobs. A weak job market differs from moral hazard because individuals do 
not have a choice of whether to continue to collect UI or return to work. When there are no job 
openings, people cannot get a job whether they are susceptible to moral hazard or not.  
 
A contributing factor to both unemployment duration and the weaker job market is firms 
increasing their production efficiency.  Due to the length and severity of the recession firms 
realized they couldn’t just “make do” like in previous recessions; structural changes were needed 
in order to meet demand with reduced staff. As a result firms found ways to become more 
efficient and produce more output with fewer resources, specifically labor (Thurm, 2012). Firm 
efficiency improved so much that when the economy improved and consumer consumption rose, 
firms found that, because of their improved efficiency, they did not need to hire back as many 
workers. With firms hiring back fewer workers, many individuals remained unemployed.  
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3.4 Skills Mismatch/Inefficient Labor Market 
During the Great Recession many individuals were competing for a small number of jobs. Many 
of those out of work found themselves not only competing with each other but against the rising 
qualification standards of employers. While unemployed, many individuals lost some of their job 
skills (through lack of use) or their skills became obsolete as technology passed them by. The 
longer individuals are unemployed the greater the problem of lost/obsolete skills becomes. There 
were numerous accounts of firms that could not find qualified workers to meet their needs, 
especially at positions that require higher skill levels (Sullivan, 2013).  
 
During an economic boom there is low unemployment and a high number of job openings, while 
during a recession there is high unemployment and few job openings. The Beveridge curve 
depicts this relationship between the unemployment rate and the job vacancy rate. Typically, 
when the labor market is operating normally, the relationship between unemployment and job 
openings is stable and follows a specific curve (see Figure 3). During the Great Recession this 
relationship began to diverge when the number of job openings began to increase much faster 
than the unemployment rate decreased resulting in an outward shift of the Beveridge curve. The 
break from the normal shape of the Beveridge curve indicates an inefficient labor market where 
workers are not properly being matched up with open jobs.  
 
The main culprit is believed to be a mismatch of skills. Hobijn and Sahin (2013) examine the 
collapse of the housing market in the United States and found a disproportionately large number 
of construction workers became unemployed. These construction workers may not have the job 
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skills required to get service sector jobs so they remain unemployed because there is no work for 
them in the construction sector. Another study (Ghayad & Dickens, 2013) separated the 
Beveridge curve into different levels of unemployment duration and found that the anomaly was 
caused by individuals unemployed for 26 weeks or more. This would indicate that either the 
long-term unemployed do lose skills over time or that employers might have less of a desire to 
hire individuals who have been unemployed a long time due to a stigma on the long-term 
unemployed.  
3.5 Higher Employer Costs 
Hagedorn et al (2013a) propose an alternate theory that examines unemployment duration and UI 
from the perspective of the firm. The UI payroll tax is a cost to employers and any changes to UI 
will affect the amount of tax employers must pay. EUC may increase labor costs, through the 
payroll tax, to employers which lowers a firm’s profits. Since the payroll tax burden of the 
employer is partially determined by the number of workers he or she employs, the presence of 
EUC lowers the likelihood of a firm hiring additional workers as firms try to save money. As 
explained above, fewer job openings results in individuals remaining unemployed longer.   
 
There are several theories behind the rise in unemployment duration. In this paper I hope to 
provide a formal argument that moral hazard, resulting from extending UI benefits, increases 
unemployment duration. The issue of moral hazard is not only important in the case of UI, but a 
potential issue for any public social program (and even some private insurance programs). If this 
research finds a significant moral hazard problem in UI then all other public social programs 
could potentially be at risk as well. Section 9 will provide some discussion on how policy makers 
might view the issue of moral hazard as it relates to UI based on the findings of the paper. 
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4 Literature Review 
There is a large body of literature that has examined changes in unemployment levels, duration 
of unemployment, and the impacts of UI benefits. These studies try to explain changes in 
unemployment and duration, and any role UI has had in those changes. Primarily the findings 
have shown that UI increases both the level and duration of unemployment. This section will 
examine some of the literature that has sought to further explain some of the nuances between 
the interaction of UI and unemployment duration.  
4.1 Increases in Job-Search Time 
The main body of literature on unemployment duration has been driven by the early work of 
Katz and Meyer (1990) and Card and Levine (2000). These authors used hazard models to 
estimate the impact of UI benefit extensions on individuals’ job search time. A hazard model 
uses a vector of factors to estimate how long an individual will remain in the UI program. The 
theory states that individuals will delay their job search or extend their search if they are 
receiving UI or UI benefits are extended.  
 
The studies found that extending UI benefits resulted in longer job search times. They found that 
UI creates a disincentive for individuals to look for a job until their benefits were about to be 
exhausted and extending benefits only exacerbated this effect. The increase in job search time 
results in an increase in unemployment duration as individuals are not quickly returning to work 
because they are taking more time to find a job.  
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Although job search time was found to increase as UI benefits were extended, the authors found 
the effect to be modest. Estimated duration increases ranged from about 1 to 2.5 weeks based on 
a 13 week benefit increase. It should be noted that Katz and Meyer (1990) examined data from 
recessionary times, as is the case with most of the literature, while Card and Levine (2000) were 
able to take advantage of a natural experiment which was the result of a policy tradeoff in New 
Jersey during the mid-1990s. A period of economic growth meant they did not have to control 
for the effects of a weak labor market.
2
 Card and Levine found slightly smaller increases in 
unemployment duration from UI benefit extensions compared with studies during recessionary 
times. This could mean that despite previous authors’ best attempts to control for labor market 
conditions, some of the effects of the recession might have spilled over into the effect of 
extending UI, biasing the impact upwards.  
 
These seminal papers used state administrative data to estimate their results. Administrative data 
provides detailed information about all individuals who received UI. An important aspect of the 
data is that the authors were able to track individuals over time, through receipt of UI payments, 
so they knew when individuals left the program. This gave authors the complete duration spell of 
an individual. A limitation of state administrative data is a smaller sample size.  Also, only those 
unemployed individuals in the UI program were examined; the studies could say nothing about 
the unemployment duration of those who did not receive UI. To overcome this deficiency, 
Rothstein (2011) used data from the CPS
3
 to estimate his job search hazard model. Rothstein 
found that job search effort increased near the point of benefit exhaustion, so extending benefits 
                                                             
2 Separating out the effect of a poor labor market conditions is a common difficulty in the literature. 
3 The CPS provides a larger sample as well as unemployed individuals who receive UI and those who do not. 
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would delay the increase in job search effort. Like previous studies, the effect of extending 
benefits on unemployment duration was small.  
 
4.2 Increased Unemployment Levels 
While the impacts of UI are often examined on a ‘micro’ level by looking at individual 
unemployment durations, some research has been done to examine the effects of UI on a ‘macro’ 
level by looking the national unemployment rate. Hagedorn et al (2013a), using equilibrium job 
search models, estimated that extending UI benefits has a large, significant effect on the number 
of people unemployed and that EUC accounted for the majority of the sustained high 
unemployment during the Great Recession. The authors estimated that a 1% increase in the 
length of UI benefits for one quarter increased the unemployment rate by 0.06 log points. The 
average amount of UI available was 82.5 weeks for a period of 16 consecutive quarters in the 
Great Recession. The authors’ estimates predict that during those 16 quarters the unemployment 
rate rose from 5% to 8.6% because of the UI extension. 
 
Farber and Valletta (2013), in addition to looking at impacts on duration
4
, estimate that the UI 
benefit extension during the Great Recession resulted in the unemployment rate increasing by 
about 0.4 percentage points. This is a small effect, relative to the high unemployment rate during 
the Great Recession and relative to the estimate
5
 by Hagedorn et al (2013a).  
Absar et al (2013) examined the impact of extending UI benefits during the Great Recession on 
state unemployment rates. The authors estimated that for every additional week of extended UI 
                                                             
4 Farber and Valletta (2013) estimated a 7% increase in expected unemployment duration resulting from the UI 
benefit extensions from 2009-2011.  
5 The large difference in estimates could be due to the use of different datasets. Farber and Valletta (2013) used CPS 
data while Hagedorn et al (2013a) used JOLTS and Local Area Unemployment Statistics (LAUS) from the BLS. 
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benefits in the prior quarter the state unemployment rate increased by about 0.025 percentage 
points.  
4.3  Differences across Demographics 
Another question that has been asked by several researchers is whether UI benefit increases 
affect different groups differently. Winter-Ebmer (2001) and Schmieder et al (2012)  examined 
the impacts of extending UI on different age groups in Europe. In Austria, a policy change 
resulted in select areas of the country receiving UI benefit extensions. Using a difference-in-
difference technique, Winter-Ebmer (2001) found that extending benefits not only increased 
unemployment duration but resulted in an increase in entry to unemployment as well. Older 
workers were found to have especially high rates of entry into unemployment resulting from the 
benefit extension. Unemployment rates rose high enough that the law increasing benefits was 
abolished. 
 
In Germany, unemployed persons are eligible for different lengths of UI benefits depending on 
their age, with older workers being eligible for longer benefits compared with younger workers. 
Schmieder et al (2012) used regression discontinuity to find that after individuals reach the 
eligible age the benefit increase creates a small disincentive to work. 
 
Aaronson et al (2010) used a Blinder-Oaxaca Decomposition to examine how much of the 
increases in unemployment duration resulted from changing labor force demographics in the 
United States. The authors found that demographic factors account for a significant portion of 
the increase in unemployment duration over time, however those factors only account for a 
portion of the dramatic increases seen in the most recent recession. The demographic factors 
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examined by Aaronson et al were age, gender, marital status, race, education, industry and 
occupation. Although the authors found that most of the individual changes in these factors had 
little effect, age was a notable exception. Younger workers (less than 24 years old) tend to have 
shorter duration spells than older workers because they frequently enter and exit the labor force. 
Over time there has been a large decrease in the young workers’ share of the labor force, and 
with fewer shorter duration spells the average duration level will rise. Another notable cause of 
increased unemployment duration is the rise of women’s duration spells, which account for 
nearly all of the increase in duration from the mid-1980s to the mid-2000s. This is due to greater 
numbers of women entering the labor force over that period.  
4.4  Differences in Income 
Following Chetty’s (2005) income effect theory, described in section 3.2, he compares duration 
spells of groups with different incomes. He found that constrained households or those with low 
liquid wealth are affected by increases in UI benefits more than unconstrained households or 
those with higher liquid wealth. Using hazard models, Chetty’s estimates revealed two key 
findings. First, that UI benefits cause large increases in unemployment duration for constrained 
households or those with low liquidity. Second that UI benefits cause small substitution effects 
(moral hazard) on unconstrained households or those with higher levels of liquidity. To separate 
out the income and substitution effects Chetty took advantage of lump sum severance payments 
to unemployed individuals. There were large impacts on duration from the severance payments 
on the constrained households and no impact on unconstrained households. With severance 
payments being a one-time event there is little opportunity to substitute one activity for another 
but there is opportunity to change spending behavior; this represents the income effect. An 
individual from a low-liquidity household can take a lump sum payment and spend it on basic 
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goods, which can lengthen unemployment duration because that individual’s basic needs are met 
for a period of time. Chetty assumes that if the substitution effect or moral hazard for both 
groups is of similar size then the income effect on constrained households is very large. This is a 
major assumption that Chetty acknowledges needs further examination.  
 
Exploring the same issue, Corsini (2013) provides evidence on the impact of extending UI 
benefits on unemployment duration from Italy. Corsini also uses hazard models to find that 
unemployment benefits do not increase the duration spells of wealthier households. Duration was 
shown to largely decrease when the lost job was a major source of income to the household, but 
providing UI benefits to offset the loss of that income will increase duration spells. Corsini 
argues that this finding indicates that the amount of lost household consumption is a very 
important factor in determining an unemployed individual’s search effort for work, and thus his 
or her duration spell. Both Chetty and Corsini argue that constraints of liquidity have a major 
effect on unemployment duration. Those who benefit the most from receiving UI are the ones 
who are most impacted by it.  
4.5 North Carolina Policy Experiment 
An interesting policy development is taking place in North Carolina, where UI benefits were 
reduced. Starting in July of last year a law was passed that made North Carolina residents 
ineligible for federal UI benefit extensions, leaving unemployed individuals only able to receive 
the standard benefits. Hagedorn et al (2013b) have examined preliminary employment data from 
North Carolina since the policy change and found that unemployment has fallen and employment 
levels have risen. The authors examined three different data sets and found similar results across 
all three. They also compared the data of nearby states and found that employment growth in 
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North Carolina is increasing faster than neighboring states. Hagedorn et al (2013b) state that 
these are only preliminary findings from a single state and readers should exercise caution when 
drawing conclusions about the results of the initial data. As more data comes in it will be 
interesting to see if the positive employment shifts continue and what effects this may have on 
future unemployment policy.  
 
The objective of this paper is to further expand on the literature by including data from after the 
Great Recession up to 2013. The study will make use of the variation in EUC eligibility across 
states. This paper takes into account the changes in EUC, both extension lengths and eligibility 
changes, over the entire period the program was active (see Table 2).  
5 Methodology 
This section discusses the methods used to answer two questions about how much of the 
dramatic increase in unemployment duration can be attributed to the extension of UI benefits 
during the Great Recession. The first question examined is how much of the increase in 
unemployment duration can be attributed to the extension of UI benefits? I hypothesize that a 
small but statistically significant portion of the increase in unemployment duration can be 
attributed to the extension of UI benefits.  
 
The ideal method of finding the true impact that extending benefits had on unemployment 
duration is to take the difference of an individual’s actual outcome from the individual’s 
counterfactual outcome. An unemployed individual’s actual outcome is the duration spell he or 
she experienced while receiving extended UI. The counterfactual outcome is that same 
individual’s duration spell if he or she had not received extended UI. This ideal scenario is not 
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possible because a person cannot be observed as being in two different states of the world at 
once (cannot both receive extended UI and not receive extended UI over the same time period). 
Instead it would be necessary to find a “comparison” group of unemployed individuals who 
receive only regular UI benefits (26 weeks) whose unemployment durations can be compared to 
the durations of the “treatment” group of unemployed individuals who receive the extended UI 
benefits over the same period. The difference in unemployment durations of the two groups is 
the impact of extending UI benefits.  
 
Unfortunately, the benefit extension was a nation-wide program that affected all unemployed 
individuals so data for the above “comparison” group does not exist. Instead the analysis will 
take advantage of the different eligibility requirements across the separate tiers of EUC that 
create variation across states in the maximum number of weeks of UI individuals can receive 
(see Table 2). Eligibility for certain tiers of EUC is dependent on a state reaching certain 
unemployment thresholds (see Table 1). Because of the variation across individual state 
unemployment rates (see Figure 4); individuals from one state could be eligible for more weeks 
of UI than individuals from another state. Differences in state economies result in large 
variations in unemployment rates between states that would affect the level of EUC benefits 
residents are eligible for. Residents in states with higher, sustained unemployment rates when 
EUC was in effect would have been eligible for more weeks of UI for a longer period of time 
compared with states with lower unemployment rates over that same time period. This variation 
across states in the maximum number of weeks of UI allows for the estimation of the impact of 
UI benefit extension on unemployment duration (see Table 1).  
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5.1 OLS Regression 
To determine how much of the increase in unemployment duration can be attributed to the UI 
benefit extension the analysis will begin with a basic OLS regression model. Panel CPS data
6
 
will be used to examine how individual unemployment durations vary with the weeks of UI 
eligibility between states going back to 2003.
7
 To estimate the difference, a standard OLS 
regression model will regress the maximum number of weeks of UI an individual is eligible for 
on unemployment duration, controlling for individual characteristics as well as labor market 
conditions. The model will be specified as follows: 
                         (1) 
where UD is the unemployment duration, measured in number of weeks, and X is a vector of 
individual characteristics such as age, gender and education (see Table 5 for full list of controls). 
MaxUI is the maximum number of weeks of UI an individual is eligible to receive, and L 
represents economic factors that would influence unemployment duration including 
unemployment rates. 
 
The key variable of interest, MaxUI, estimates how much an individual’s unemployment 
duration is impacted by the maximum weeks of UI that person is eligible to receive.  The 
coefficient of MaxUI can be interpreted as the 'the effect each additional week of maximum UI 
duration on unemployment duration' while holding the effects of other factors constant. As the 
maximum duration of UI increases it is expected that unemployment duration will increase as 
                                                             
6 The CPS is not a true panel dataset; see section 7 for further discussion. 
7 Data on EUC and EB active triggers for states could only be collected going back to 2003. As a result the 
regression results will only have observations from 2003-2013.  
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well. The addition of other economic and individual characteristics in the model helps control for 
the impact of the recession to isolate the effect of MaxUI. 
 
The impacts of the controls such as age, gender, race, education and income, on duration spells 
could also be of interest. Aaronson et al  (2010) estimated that demographics account for a large 
portion of unemployment duration; however only a portion of the recent increase in duration can 
be attributed to changing demographic factors. Adding these controls is important to avoid 
omitted variable bias since previous research has shown that demographics of the workforce play 
a big role in determining unemployment duration. 
 
Controlling for the labor market (through national and state unemployment rates as well as the 
number of national job openings) is critical as previous research has shown that labor market 
conditions are one of the major factors that determine unemployment and duration levels. 
Valletta and Kuang (2012) estimated that for a 12 month period ending in August 2011 nearly 
half (about 7.5 weeks) of the 15 week increase in unemployment duration during that time is the 
result of the persistence of employment losses from the recession.  
 
One limitation of using a basic OLS model is the inability to control for potential underlying 
trends affecting the data. These trends could be either occurring over time (a systemic or cyclical 
change in the labor market) or resulting from differences across states outside of the differences 
in UI eligibility. By not properly accounting for these trends the results could be biased from 
omitting important and relevant variables. Adding fixed effects for state and year to the model 
will help to control for those trends. 
26 
 
 
5.2 Fixed Effects 
The effect of the benefit extension would not have the same impact over time or across different 
states.  So it does not make sense to estimate a single, one time national impact of the benefit 
increase. Using both state and year fixed effects will control for these trends and strengthen the 
explanatory power of equation (1). The inclusion of the fixed effects also removes omitted 
variable bias from the estimates.  
 
Important factors to consider are variables that do not change over time. This is best seen in 
differences across states. State economies can vary widely; a dominant sector in one may have 
little influence in another, leading to differences in workforces and unemployment patterns. 
There are differences in UI eligibility requirements between states that might not be completely 
controlled for by the MaxUI variable. There are also differences in other social programs that can 
have an effect on how long individuals remain unemployed, or if they participate in UI. States 
can vary greatly so it will be important to account for those differences by adding state fixed 
effects.
8
 Adding fixed effects to the model does lower the degrees of freedom, but this is a 
limitation that is easily overcome with the use of large samples. When only the state fixed effects 
are added to equation (1) the model is specified as follows: 
                              (2) 
where    represents state fixed effects and is the time invariant component of the error term and 
    is the error term. 
 
                                                             
8 Similar to year fixed effects, a dummy variable indicating which state an individual is from will need to be added 
to the model. All states except one receive a dummy indicator. This is done avoid issues of perfect collinearity. The 
state not included will act as a baseline to which all other states are compared. 
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Unemployment duration might follow a particular pattern over time or a specific year(s) might 
have an effect on unemployment duration relative to other years. Year fixed effects will capture 
the variation in unemployment duration year over year.
9
 It would be important to control for 
individual years because there might be events happening across multiple states in particular 
years that are not being picked up by either the controls or state fixed effects. When year fixed 
effects are added to equation (2) the model is specified as follows: 
                                                                     (3) 
where    represents the year fixed effects and is the common observed time trend and     is the 
error term containing time varying unobserved characteristics. 
 
MaxUI is the key variable of interest and will estimate how much an individual’s unemployment 
duration is impacted by the number of weeks of UI that person is eligible to receive. As the 
maximum number of weeks of UI increases it is expected that unemployment duration will 
increase as well. The addition of other economic and individual characteristics will help control 
for the impact of the recession as well as any individual level variation, in order to isolate the 
effect of MaxUI.  
 
Fixed effects also allow for comparisons between different states or across different years. The 
EUC benefit extension might have affected the unemployment duration differently depending on 
the state; one state might have seen a greater rise in unemployment duration resulting from the 
benefit increase compared to another state. Impacts could also be compared across years to see if 
                                                             
9 To add year fixed effects a dummy variable which stands for an indicator for each year (except one) can be added 
to the model. One year (generally the first in the sample) is not added to avoid perfect collinearity in the model and 
act as the baseline to which all other years are compared. 
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the impact of the benefit increase on unemployment duration was greater in one particular year 
over another. 
 
The second question asks whether extensions in UI benefits have a larger impact on the long-
term unemployed. I hypothesize that the impact of extending benefits has a significant impact on 
the long-term unemployed and that the effect would be greater compared to the entire 
unemployed population.  
 
To answer this question the analysis will employ the same models described above but instead of 
using the duration spells of all unemployed individuals the sample will be restricted to only those 
who have durations greater than 26 weeks. The controls in the models remain the same but the 
dependent variable now becomes long-term unemployment duration which is measured in weeks 
like the previous models but has a smaller range (see Table 5 for summary statistics). The key 
variable of interest, MaxUI, will now estimate how much the duration spell an individual who is 
long-term unemployed will be impacted by extending UI benefits. It is expected that MaxUI will 
be positive and larger in magnitude than the results of the previous models.  
6 Data 
All of the data used in this paper comes from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).  A part of the 
US Department of Labor, the BLS works to provide timely, accurate information on the United 
States economy and labor market activity.  
 
The primary dataset is a sample from the Current Population Survey (CPS), a monthly survey of 
60,000 households (King et al, 2010). The survey provides comprehensive information on the 
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employment and unemployment experience of the United States population (BLS, 2014b). The 
purpose of the CPS is to gain a sense of the nation’s working experience as well as information 
about income. Demographic and economic characteristics about each individual and their 
household are also collected.  
 
The specific sample utilized for analysis from the CPS is the Annual Social and Economic 
Supplement (ASEC). This supplement survey is conducted every March and expands on the 
regular CPS by asking more detailed questions on social and economic characteristics and the 
work experience of each individual. This version of the CPS is used because of the additional 
unemployment information available including: how many continuous weeks that individual has 
been unemployed. For this research, data was collected from the ASEC conducted every March 
since 1977.  Only individuals who are classified as either unemployed or not in the labor force 
were included in the sample. 
 
The three models described above will be each estimated twice using two different dependent 
variables, both of which measure unemployment duration. The first dependent variable includes 
duration spells from the entire sample and the second dependent variable includes only those 
duration spells of individuals who are long-term unemployed. This is done to see if extending 
benefits has an impact on the long-term unemployed that is different from the entire unemployed 
population.  
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The full duration spell sample includes only individuals who are unemployed or out of the labor 
force at the time of their survey response, from 2003-2013. All unemployment durations are 
included in the full duration sample to capture the impact on the total unemployed population.  
The long-term duration sample also includes only individuals who are unemployed or out of the 
labor force and have duration spells are greater than 26 weeks.  
 
To estimate the impact of UI benefit increases on duration, a variable was created that shows the 
maximum number of weeks of UI benefits an individual is eligible to receive, dependent on the 
unemployment rate of that individual’s state. This variable, MaxUI, includes all possible benefits 
from each program:  standard UI benefits (26 weeks), EB (max of 20 weeks), and EUC (max 53 
weeks).  
 
MaxUI accounts for the changes in EUC (see Table 2) as well as the changing state eligibility for 
either program based on unemployment rates (see Figure 4). Information on when EB and EUC 
were triggered for each state going back to 2003 was collected from the BLS (see Table 1). The 
variation in MaxUI across states can be seen in Figure 5. 
 
In order to accurately analyze the effect of moral hazard on unemployment duration other factors 
that have an impact on duration will have to be controlled for. The following are several 
variables that were collected to control for other impacts. These controls are macro variables, 
rather than at the individual micro level of the CPS, and are matched to individual records in the 
CPS data by year and state. 
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The strength or weakness of the labor market is one of the biggest factors in determining 
unemployment duration (Aaronson et al 2010; Valletta and Kuang 2012). In order to isolate the 
impact of extending UI benefits on duration spells, this paper will utilize three measures to 
control for the condition of the nation’s labor market. The first will be the national 
unemployment rate, which is estimated on a monthly basis by the BLS.  
 
Individual state unemployment rates are collected as a part of Local Area Unemployment 
Statistics (LAUS), a joint effort by states and the federal government to estimate employment 
levels for each state as well as metropolitan areas, counties and cities with populations larger 
than 25,000. Monthly unemployment rates were collected for each state (and the District of 
Columbia) going back to 1977. Economies can vary widely from state to state, so having 
individual state unemployment information will provide a much clearer picture of the condition 
of the labor market than just national level data. 
 
In 2000, the Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS) was created by the BLS to 
measure national labor demand. Approximately 16,000 businesses, across all nonagricultural 
industries and in both the private and public sectors, are surveyed and data is released each 
month. The data collected from the JOLTS survey can be a good measure of the tightness of the 
national labor market, and it provides a more accurate picture of the national labor landscape 
from the demand (employer’s) side. Multiple measures are calculated from the JOLTS data (see 
Table 6) but this analysis will use the number of job openings in the nation. Unfortunately 
JOLTS is not separated out by state, so this variable can only proxy as a control for the national 
labor market and will not be able to pick up any variation between states. The job openings value 
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can be used alongside the unemployment rate, to provide a more complete picture of the supply 
side of the nation’s labor market.  
7 Limitations 
One major limitation of using the CPS dataset is the inability to track the same individuals over 
time because of partial participant turnover each month (Census Bureau, 2013).  Since 
individuals cannot be tracked the full length of an individuals’ unemployment duration spell 
cannot be measured, since the survey only captures the length of the spell at one point in time. 
The CPS will only provide data on unemployment duration if the individual is in the midst of a 
spell; there is no information on when the spell ended or how long it continued after the survey. 
Not knowing the full length of the spell will result in some downward bias in the measurement of 
unemployment duration, although the size of the bias is unclear. The full duration models assume 
that extending benefits might influence the length of an unemployment spell for all durations. 
The model would capture the impact of extending benefits along the entire distribution of spells, 
but with incomplete duration data the estimated impact would not be accurate.  
 
There is further bias introduced to unemployment duration because the survey is skewed toward 
longer spells of duration; this effect was examined for poverty spells by Bane and Ellwood 
(1983). For a survey taken at a particular point in time individuals who have longer spells of 
unemployment duration are more likely to appear in the survey compared with individuals with 
shorter spells. This results in some upward bias, although the size of the bias is also unclear. The 
models with long-term duration as the dependent variable would avoid some of this bias because 
the sample examined only includes those with longer spells. Upward bias would not be as large 
for the long-term duration models because there are fewer shorter spells being estimated.   
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Another limitation is the lack of data on participation history in the UI program, whether the 
respondent is currently receiving benefits or if they have previously exhausted all benefits 
available to them. To account for this an indicator if an individual has reported receiving income 
from UI in the last year will be used as a proxy for participation in the UI program. 
 
A final limitation comes with the difficulty in separating out the effect of the Great Recession 
from the effect of the benefit increase, especially since the downturn in the economy resulted in 
the EUC extension. Instead of simply using an indicator that was equal to one when the benefit 
increase occurred, which would too closely align with the recession, this analysis takes 
advantage of the variation across states in how many weeks of the extension were available to 
the unemployed. Unfortunately the variation across states is partially due to changes in the 
economy, so there will be some influence from the poor labor market within MaxUI. The effect 
of the Great Recession could not be fully controlled for so the following results may not reveal 
the true impact of the benefit increase.  
8 Results 
This section reports the results of the models discussed above. The models using full duration 
spells are presented in Table 7 and the results of the long-term unemployed models are presented 
in Table 8. 
8.1 OLS Model Results for All Duration Spells 
The results in column one of Table 7 show that MaxUI is statistically significant and positive; 
indicating that as the maximum UI eligibility duration goes up, on average a person’s spell of 
unemployment duration also increases, holding all other factors constant. On average, for each 
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additional week of extended UI benefits, an individual’s unemployment duration increased by 
0.16 weeks, holding all other factors constant. Based on the increase in the average maximum 
weeks of UI benefits (about 65 weeks) as a result of the benefit extension, duration spells 
increased by about 10.52 weeks.   
 
Both the state and national unemployment rates have significant impacts on duration of 
unemployment spells, which was expected with these variables acting as a proxy for the 
condition of the labor market. One of the largest impacts on unemployment duration was race. 
The race indicators were all statistically significant and had relatively large impacts compared to 
MaxUI
10. On average a black individual’s unemployment duration is 5.5 weeks longer compared 
to the unemployment duration of a white individual, holding all other factors constant; this was 
the largest effect from a particular race on duration spells. Females, on average, had shorter 
unemployment durations than men by about 1.5 weeks, a statistically significant difference. 
Total family income had a negative impact on duration spells, although it is a small impact. For 
every one thousand dollars a family earns, the unemployed family member’s duration spell 
decreases by 0.05 weeks, holding other factors constant. The direction of this effect makes sense: 
as family members earn more income they would be able to provide for an unemployed family 
member such that he or she would not need to receive UI.  
8.11  OLS Model Results for Long-term Unemployed 
The results in column one of Table 8 reveal a positive, significant estimate for MaxUI on the 
long-term unemployed, indicating that as the maximum UI eligibility duration goes up, a long-
term unemployed person’s spell of unemployment duration also increases. On average, for each 
additional week of extended UI benefits, a long-term unemployed individual’s duration spell 
                                                             
10
 White is the reference category for race. 
35 
 
increased by 0.17 weeks, holding all other factors constant. Based on the increase in the average 
maximum weeks of UI benefits (about 65 weeks) as a result of the benefit extension, duration 
spells of the long-term unemployed increased by about 11.17 weeks.  As expected the impact of 
MaxUI on the long-term unemployed is slightly greater than the impact on all duration spells 
from the OLS model in column one of Table 7. 
 
When examining the controls for the long-term unemployed model, there are some notable 
differences from the results of the full duration model. The impact of state unemployment rates 
on long-term duration spells decreased by more than half while the effect of the national 
unemployment rate became insignificant. The effect of being black compared to white decreased 
notably while remaining significant. Hawaiian/Pacific Islander was the only race indicator that 
was insignificant. Both indicators for education, having at least a high school diploma and 
having at least a Bachelor’s degree as well as the indicator for being married were insignificant 
while they were significant in the full duration model. These factors might be insignificant now 
because they might not be as predictive of duration spells for the long-term unemployed, who are 
a more disadvantaged group. T here might be alternative factors that determine the duration of 
the long-term unemployed that are not controlled for in the model, such as lost skills, mental 
illness, functional impairments, etc.  
8.2 State Fixed Effects Model Results for All Duration Spells 
After adding state fixed effects, the results in column two of Table 7 show that MaxUI is 
statistically significant and positive. On average, for each additional week of extended UI 
benefits, an individual’s unemployment duration increases by 0.17 weeks, holding all other 
factors constant. Based on the increase in the average maximum weeks of UI benefits (about 65 
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weeks) as a result of the benefit extension, duration spells increased by about 11.17 weeks.  This 
effect is slightly larger than the OLS result. 
 
The results from adding state fixed effects are similar to the OLS model results for all duration 
spells. One difference was national unemployment rate, which became insignificant when state 
fixed effects were added. The insignificant effect could be the result of national job openings 
capturing the effect of the national labor market or state level labor markets have more influence 
on duration spells compared to the national level. Another difference was the drop in magnitude 
of the effect of living in a metro area. In the OLS model, residing in a metro area increased 
duration spells by 1.36 weeks over residing in a rural area, but when state fixed effects were 
added that impact fell to 0.65 weeks. This effect could be the result of industries that were hit 
especially hard during the recession being primarily located in metropolitan areas. The indicator 
for being married slightly decreased from the OLS full duration model. The duration spell of an 
individual who is married is, on average, 1.4 weeks fewer than the duration spell of a single 
individual, holding other factors constant. Unemployed individuals with spouses, who 
presumably are employed, could be supported by their spouse.  
 
8.21 State Fixed Effects Model Results for Long-term Unemployed 
After adding state fixed effects, the results in column two of Table 8 reveal a positive, significant 
estimate for MaxUI on the long-term unemployed. On average, for each additional week of 
extended UI benefits, a long-term unemployed individual’s duration spell increases by 0.18 
weeks, holding all other factors constant. Based on the increase in the average maximum weeks 
of UI benefits (about 65 weeks) as a result of the benefit extension, duration spells of the long-
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term unemployed increased by about 11.83 weeks.  As expected the impact on the long-term 
unemployed is greater than, but only slightly, the impact on all durations from the OLS model in 
column two of Table 7.  
 
The state fixed effects long-term duration model produced very similar results for the controls at 
the OLS long-term duration model. The effect of age, which decreased only slightly, was 
positive and significant. Age’s impact on duration spells is larger than the impact of the benefit 
increase. For each additional year of age, there is an increase in unemployment duration of .25 
weeks, holding other factors constant. This result supports previous findings that older 
individuals have longer unemployment duration spells compared to younger workers (Aaronson 
et al, 2010).  
8.3 State and Year Fixed Effects Model Results for All Duration Spells 
When including both state and year fixed effects, the results in column three of Table 7 reveal 
that MaxUI is statistically significant and positive. On average, for each additional week of 
extended UI benefits, an individual’s unemployment duration increases by 0.08 weeks, holding 
all other factors constant. Based on the increase in the average maximum weeks of UI benefits 
(about 65 weeks) as a result of the benefit extension, duration spells increased by about 5.26 
weeks.  This effect is much smaller than the OLS and state fixed effects models, less than half of 
the other estimates impacts. A smaller effect after controlling for variation across years could 
indicate the benefit extension had greater impact in some years more than others. Those 
differences are no longer being captured in MaxUI, rather being captured by the year fixed 
effects. Year fixed effects can also account for some of the variation in MaxUI over time.  
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For the most part the impacts of the controls after adding both state and year fixed effects are 
smaller compared to the model with only state fixed effects, when examining full duration spells. 
One relatively sizeable increase was on state unemployment rates. For every percentage point 
increase in a state’s unemployment rate there is an increase of 1.3 weeks in an individual’s 
unemployment duration, holding other factors constant. The effect of living in a metro area also 
increased, while the effect of being female became a larger negative impact, meaning that 
women have shorter duration spells compared to men.  
8.31 State and Year Fixed Effects Model Results for Long-term Unemployed 
The results in column three of Table 8, after adding both state and year fixed effects, reveal a 
positive, significant estimate for MaxUI on the long-term unemployed. On average, for each 
additional week of extended UI benefits, a long-term unemployed individual’s duration spell 
increases by 0.16 weeks, holding all other factors constant. Based on the increase in the average 
maximum weeks of UI benefits (about 65 weeks) as a result of the benefit extension, duration 
spells of the long-term unemployed increased by about 10.52 weeks.  This result is noticeably 
larger than the estimate for all durations of 0.08, when state and year fixed effects are added 
which was expected. The result was hypothesized to be larger for the long-term unemployed 
because the long-term unemployed are more susceptible to changes in UI benefits compared to 
the entire unemployed population.  
The impacts of the controls for the state and year fixed effects long-term duration model are very 
similar to the estimates from the state fixed effects long-term model. National job openings, total 
family income, age, race and gender remain significant indicators of unemployment duration. 
The only race indicator that is not significant is Hawaiian/Pacific Islander. It is interesting to note 
that while black had the largest impact in all of the full duration models; it had one of the smaller 
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impacts among the race indicators for the long-term unemployed. Instead, American Indian had 
the largest effect on the duration spells of the long-term unemployed with spells lasting about 3.3 
weeks longer compared to white long-term unemployed individuals.  
 
The fixed effects model takes a more rigorous approach than the basic OLS model by separating 
out the effects of the UI benefit extension across years and states. The estimates of the fixed 
effects model are preferred because of the ability to control for variation across years and states.  
9 Conclusion 
The analysis estimated a statistically significant impact of extending UI benefits on 
unemployment duration. This finding indicates that at least a portion of the dramatic increase in 
unemployment duration around the time of the Great Recession can be attributed to the federal 
extension of unemployment insurance benefits during that period. If the maximum duration of UI 
benefits increased by one week, an average individual’s unemployment duration increased by 
0.08 weeks, holding all other factors constant. Based on the increase in the average maximum 
weeks of UI benefits (about 65 weeks) as a result of the benefit extension, duration spells 
increased by about 5.26 weeks. In addition, the analysis also found that extending UI benefits has 
a greater impact on the long-term unemployed relative to the entire unemployed population. If 
the maximum duration of UI benefits increased by one week an average, long-term unemployed 
individual’s duration spell increased by 0.16 weeks, holding all other factors constant. Based on 
the increase in the average maximum weeks of UI benefits (about 65 weeks) as a result of the 
benefit extension, duration spells of the long-term unemployed increased by about 10.52 weeks. 
 
40 
 
A significant finding indicates that extending UI benefits might result in a moral hazard effect 
and lead to increased unemployment duration spells. Policy makers need to take care when 
addressing issues of moral hazard in unemployment insurance because there can be positive 
outcomes to longer duration spells as well as negative outcomes discussed earlier. Individuals 
can take advantage of extended UI benefits to take additional time to find a good, higher-paying 
job. This not only benefits the individual but having more people in stable, well-compensated 
occupations has benefits for the economy.  
 
The much larger impact on the long-term unemployed, twice as large as the impact on the entire 
unemployed population, raises concerns. For those already with long spells of unemployment, 
extending UI benefits increases unemployment duration at a greater rate relative to the entire 
unemployed population. This suggests a more targeted approach is needed to assist the long-term 
unemployed in returning to work.  
 
There are some limitations in this research that could be influencing the findings of the analysis. 
One is an issue of selection with the long-term unemployed as they are more likely to “select” to 
remain unemployed when there are extended UI benefits available compared to short-term 
unemployed. The issue of selection is troublesome because the individuals who select to remain 
long-term unemployed might have some fundamental differences from those who choose to drop 
out of the labor force or who end up finding a job. The potential selection issue is not examined 
in this paper and those potential differences between groups are not explored. The data issues 
discussed earlier are another limitation that affects the estimates. The structure and format of the 
CPS and the lack of complete data on the same individuals over time lower the ability to estimate 
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the true impact of extending benefits on unemployment duration. Another issue is the heavy 
reliance on state variation in EUC to estimate the impact of benefit extensions on duration. The 
variation is the result of differences in state economic conditions the effects of which might not 
be completely captured by the MaxUI variable. Additionally, the effect of the Great Recession 
could not be completely controlled for because MaxUI incorporates differences in state economic 
conditions.  
9.1 Policy Implications 
Since EUC’s expiration, policy makers have been debating whether to refund the program. 
Recently the U.S. Senate passed a bill that would renew EUC through May of this year and 
provide retroactive payments to individuals whose benefits expired at the end of last year (Kane, 
2014). The bill would require greater job training for the long-term unemployed in order to 
continue to receive benefits and prevent unemployed individuals whose income in the previous 
year was greater than $1 million from receiving UI benefits. The critics of extending benefits, 
which would affect millions of Americans, call attention not only to the high cost of the program, 
expected to be about $10 billion (Kane, 2014), but cite previous literature that found extending 
benefits created disincentives to work and increased unemployment duration. 
 
The findings of this paper indicate that at least a portion of the dramatic increase in 
unemployment duration around the time of the Great Recession can be attributed to the federal 
extension of unemployment insurance benefits during that time. The significant findings indicate 
a moral hazard problem and extending benefits creates disincentives to work. These findings 
could result in policy makers altering the unemployment insurance program, like the proposed 
changes above, in order to guard against moral hazard and prevent abuses of the program.  
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Despite the significant effect of extending UI benefits, the increase in unemployment duration is 
not necessarily all due to moral hazard.  Some of the Great Recession’s impact is still present in 
the MaxUI variable, possibly inflating the size of the extension’s effect. Even with the 
uncertainty of the true size of the moral hazard effects, there is still a large problem with high 
unemployment duration levels (see Figure 2). Finding ways to aid unemployed individuals in 
returning to work will help to make the labor market more efficient and reduce the stigma against 
the long-term unemployed (Ghayad & Dickens, 2013).  
 
Lawrence Katz, cited earlier for finding that extending UI benefits creates disincentives to work, 
now believes that extending UI benefits is the right policy because the current labor market is 
very different from when he conducted his research in the 1970s and 1980s (Jacobson, 2009). 
Katz pointed to the high number of job seekers per job opening and that disincentives to work in 
the 70s and 80s were an issue because jobs were less scarce. Today disincentives to work are not 
a problem when many individuals simply cannot find work. UI provides a valuable safety net 
and reducing benefits or enacting more stringent eligibility requirements would likely have far 
worse consequences than moral hazard. 
 
Additional research is needed to more accurately estimate the impact of extending 
unemployment insurance. The variable MaxUI captures some differences in economic conditions 
between states which biases the impact of the benefit extension. Models that better control for 
the poor economic conditions during the Great Recession would better estimate the impact of 
extending UI benefits on unemployment duration. Future research on this topic should combine 
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past approaches and use both administrative UI data as well as data from the CPS to overcome 
the data issues of the CPS. Further examination of the effects of UI on the long-term unemployed 
should also be conducted to determine the full extent of the disparate impacts of UI on the 
unemployed population. Looking into the possible issue of long-term selection would provide 
more insight into why the long-term unemployed are remaining out of work for such long 
stretches.  
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Data Sources 
 
CPS Data from IPUMS: 
https://cps.ipums.org/cps/ 
 
CPS description:  
http://www.bls.gov/cps/ 
 
Annual Social and Economic (ASEC) Supplement survey description: 
http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/RCMD/series/24/studies/29652?paging.startRow=1&rece
ncy=YEAR 
 
National Unemployment Rate data:  
http://data.bls.gov/pdq/SurveyOutputServlet 
 
State Unemployment Rates data – Local Area Unemployment Statistics (LAUS):  
http://www.bls.gov/lau/ 
 
Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS) data: 
http://www.bls.gov/jlt/ 
  
United States Department of Labor; UI Weekly Claims Data (EB and EUC triggers) 
http://www.oui.doleta.gov/unemploy/claims_arch.asp 
National Unemployment Duration Data 
http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/release?rid=50 
 
 
Table 1: Number of States (and District of Columbia) Eligible for EB and EUC 
Program 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
EB-13 weeks 3 1 1 0 0 0 15 7 5 7 1 
EB-20 weeks 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 31 31 24 0 
EB- Total 3 1 1 0 0 0 18 38 36 31 1 
            
EUC 
           
Tier 1 - - - - - - 51 51 51 51 51 
Tier 2 - - - - - - 35 51 51 51 39 
Tier 3 - - - - - - - 48 46 44 27 
Tier 4 - - - - - - - 29 29 23 8 
Numbers taken from March of each year 
 
Table 2: Weeks of Eligibility over EUC’s Lifetime 
July 6, 2008- 
Nov. 23, 2008 
Nov. 24, 2008-  
Nov. 7, 2009 
Nov. 8, 2009- 
Feb. 18, 2012 
Feb. 19, 2012-  
May 26, 2012 
May 27, 2012-  
Sep. 1, 2012 
Sep. 2, 2012-  
Dec. 28, 2013 
13 weeks 
-all states 
Tier I: 20 weeks  
-all states 
Tier II: 13 weeks 
-if state TUR>6% 
Tier I: 20 weeks 
-all states 
Tier II: 14 weeks 
-all states 
Tier III: 13 weeks 
-if state TUR>=6% 
Tier IV: 6 weeks 
-if state TUR>=8.5% 
Tier I: 20 weeks 
-all states 
Tier II: 14 weeks 
-all states 
Tier III: 13 weeks 
-if state TUR>=6% 
Tier IV: 6 weeks 
-if state TUR>=8.5%* 
Tier I: 20 weeks 
-all states 
Tier II: 14 weeks 
-if state TUR>=6% 
Tier III: 13 weeks 
-if state TUR>=7% 
Tier IV: 6 weeks 
-if state TUR>=9% 
Tier I: 14 weeks 
-all states 
Tier II: 14 weeks 
-if state TUR>=6% 
Tier III: 9 weeks 
-if state TUR>=7% 
Tier IV: 10 weeks 
-if state TUR>=9% 
*16 weeks if no active EB and TUR >=8.5% (Whittaker & Isaacs, 2014) 
 
 
 Table 3: Unemployed persons by duration of unemployment 
 
Not seasonally adjusted 
 
Feb 
2013 
Jan 
2014 
Feb 
2014 NUMBER OF UNEMPLOYED 
Less than 5 weeks 2440 2876 2145 
5 to 14 weeks 3366 2587 3091 
15 weeks and over 6694 5392 5657 
15 to 26 weeks 1903 1702 1771 
27 weeks and over 4791 3690 3886 
    Average (mean) duration, in weeks 36 33.3 36.3 
Median duration, in weeks 17.1 14.3 16 
    PERCENT DISTRIBUTION       
Less than 5 weeks 19.5 26.5 19.7 
5 to 14 weeks 26.9 23.8 28.4 
15 weeks and over 53.6 49.7 51.9 
15 to 26 weeks 15.2 15.7 16.3 
27 weeks and over 38.3 34 35.7 
Updated population controls are introduced annually with the release of January data. 
 Taken from BLS 
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Table 4: Unemployed persons by duration of unemployment 
 
Seasonally adjusted 
 
Feb 
2013 
Oct. 
2013 
Nov 
2013 
Dec 
2013 
Jan 
2014 
Feb 
2014 NUMBER OF UNEMPLOYED 
Less than 5 weeks 2677 2794 2439 2255 2434 2373 
5 to 14 weeks 2788 2636 2585 2506 2429 2568 
15 weeks and over 6485 5824 5786 5530 5336 5464 
15 to 26 weeks 1735 1777 1742 1651 1689 1615 
27 weeks and over 4750 4047 4044 3878 3646 3849 
       Average (mean) duration, in weeks 36.9 36 37.1 37.1 35.4 37.1 
Median duration, in weeks 17.7 16.5 17 17.1 16 16.4 
       PERCENT DISTRIBUTION             
Less than 5 weeks 22.4 24.8 22.6 21.9 23.9 22.8 
5 to 14 weeks 23.3 23.4 23.9 24.4 23.8 24.7 
15 weeks and over 54.3 51.7 53.5 53.7 52.3 52.5 
15 to 26 weeks 14.5 15.8 16.1 16 16.6 15.5 
27 weeks and over 39.7 36 37.4 37.7 35.8 37 
Updated population controls are introduced annually with the release of January data. 
  Taken from BLS 
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Table 5: Summary Statistics 2003-2013 CPS 
 
Variable 
 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
 
N 
Dependent Variables    
         Unemployment Duration 24.46 27.130 77,229 
         Long-term Duration 60.40 24.740 22,196 
Individual    
         Age 45.69 23.829 592,459 
         Gender (Female = 1) 0.60 0.490 592,459 
         At Least HS Degree 0.65 0.478 592,459 
         At Least Bachelor’s Degree 0.15 0.361 592,459 
         Marital Status (Married = 1) 0.43 0.495 592,459 
         Max Weeks of UI (MaxUI) 50.27 29.249 592,459 
Race    
         White (Reference) 0.78 0.416 592,459 
         Black 0.13 0.333 592,459 
         Asian 0.05 0.224 592,459 
         American Indian 0.02 0.124 592,459 
         Hawaiian/Pacific Islander 0.004 0.066 592,459 
         Other (2+ races) 0.02 0.147 592,459 
Household    
         Total Family Income 57,239 69,439 592,459 
         Living in Metro area (Yes = 1) 0.78 0.412 564,776 
Labor Market    
         State Unemployment Rates 6.63 2.315 592,459 
         National Unemployment Rate 6.85 1.863 592,459 
         Job Openings (000s) 3,571 675.646 592,459 
 
 
Table 6: JOLTS Data Definitions  
JOLTS DATA Calculation  
Job Openings Level Total number of openings (presented in thousands) 
Job Openings Rate Number of openings divided by (employment plus job openings) 
Hiring Rate Number of hires as a percent of total employment 
Turnover (Separations) Rate Number of total separations as a percent of total employment 
Quits Rate Number of quits as a percent of total employment 
Layoffs & Discharge Rate Number of Layoffs & Discharges as a percent of total employment 
National level data 
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Table 7: Full Unemployment Duration Results using 2003-2013 CPS 
 
 
Variable 
 
 
OLS 
 
State Fixed 
Effects 
State and 
Year Fixed 
Effects 
MaxUI 0.162*** 
(0.012) 
0.170*** 
(0.013) 
0.077*** 
(0.019) 
Age 0.320*** 
(0.008) 
0.315*** 
(0.008) 
0.315*** 
(0.008) 
Gender (female=1) -1.545*** 
(0.198) 
-1.509*** 
(0.198) 
-1.608*** 
(0.197) 
At Least HS Graduate 1.540*** 
(0.239) 
1.456*** 
(0.239) 
1.402*** 
(0.238) 
At Least Bachelor’s Degree 1.963*** 
(0.294) 
1.822*** 
(0.295) 
1.724*** 
(0.293) 
Marital Status (married=1) -1.458*** 
(0.230) 
-1.392*** 
(0.230) 
-1.386*** 
(0.229) 
Black 5.535*** 
(0.252) 
5.258*** 
(0.263) 
5.204*** 
(0.262) 
Asian 4.219*** 
(0.532) 
4.176*** 
(0.537) 
4.066*** 
(0.535) 
American Indian 2.658*** 
(0.867) 
3.177*** 
(0.882) 
3.117*** 
(0.878) 
Hawaiian/Pacific Islander 4.071** 
(1.639) 
3.987** 
(1.665) 
3.827** 
(1.659) 
Other races (2+) 2.769*** 
(0.664) 
2.877*** 
(0.669) 
2.884*** 
(0.666) 
Total family income (000s) -0.050*** 
(0.002) 
-0.052*** 
(0.002) 
-0.051*** 
(0.002) 
Living in a metro area 1.358*** 
(0.270) 
0.650** 
(0.295) 
0.741** 
(0.294) 
State unemployment rate 1.101*** 
(0.077) 
1.113*** 
(0.131) 
1.293*** 
(0.137) 
National unemployment rate 0.511** 
(0.245) 
0.330 
(0.282) 
0.530 
(0.360) 
National job openings (000s) 0.004*** 
(0.0003) 
0.004*** 
(0.0004) 
0.001** 
(0.001) 
Constant -22.681*** -22.331*** -10.748 
R^2 .1122 .1160 .1232 
N 73,489 73,489 73,489 
Standard errors in parentheses     Legend: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01 
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Table 8: Long-Term Duration Results using 2003-2013 CPS 
 
 
Variable 
 
 
OLS 
 
State Fixed 
Effects 
State and 
Year Fixed 
Effects 
MaxUI 0.167*** 
(0.019) 
0.175*** 
(0.021) 
0.155*** 
(0.032) 
Age 0.248*** 
(0.013) 
0.245*** 
(0.013) 
0.243*** 
(0.013) 
Gender (female=1) -1.456*** 
(0.335) 
-1.433*** 
(0.336) 
-1.575*** 
(0.335) 
At Least HS Graduate -0.046 
(0.427) 
-0.059 
(0.428) 
-0.137 
(0.427) 
At Least Bachelor’s Degree 0.119 
(0.467) 
0.103 
(0.469) 
-0.023 
(0.467) 
Married -0.439 
(0.383) 
-0.402 
(0.384) 
-0.410 
(0.383) 
Black 1.945*** 
(0.401) 
2.049*** 
(0.422) 
2.071*** 
(0.421) 
Asian 2.516*** 
(0.823) 
2.368*** 
(0.835) 
2.369*** 
(0.832) 
American Indian 3.322** 
(1.503) 
3.339** 
(1.540) 
3.3482* 
(1.536) 
Hawaiian/Pacific Islander 1.448 
(2.574) 
1.034 
(2.641) 
0.754 
(2.633) 
Other races (2+) 2.608** 
(1.115) 
2.611** 
(1.124) 
2.592** 
(1.120) 
Total family income (000s) -0.040*** 
(0.003) 
-0.041*** 
(0.003) 
-0.041*** 
(0.003) 
Living in a metro 0.844* 
(0.483) 
0.399 
(0.531) 
0.356 
(0.529) 
State unemployment rate 0.500*** 
(0.124) 
0.052 
(0.231) 
0.011 
(0.238) 
National unemployment rate -0.470 
(0.411) 
-0.186 
(0.500) 
0.827 
(0.720) 
National job openings (000s) 0.006*** 
(0.001) 
0.006*** 
(0.001) 
0.003*** 
(0.001) 
Constant 20.171*** 20.097** 26.122** 
R^2 .0686 .0712 .0776 
N 21,377 21,377 21,377 
Standard errors in parentheses     Legend: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01 
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Unemployment Duration Measurement Changes 
In 2011 the Consumer Population Survey (CPS) made a slight change in how it top-coded the 
maximum number of weeks of unemployment duration. The previous maximum was 99 weeks, 
meaning that if an individual had been unemployed for 110 weeks it would be recorded as 99 
weeks. A change was made during the recession to increase the maximum weeks of 
unemployment duration from 99 to 117 weeks, and then in 2011 up to 260 weeks where it 
currently stands. The BLS reports that only the average was affected by this change, while the 
median and distribution of unemployment by weeks unemployed were not affected (2011). The 
national average unemployment duration increased by about three weeks as a result of this 
measurement change, which is relatively small change compared to the amount duration 
increased during that period (Valletta & Kuang, 2012). 
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Figure 1: US Unemployment Duration 1967-2013 
 
(Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, 2014) 
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Figure 2: Number of unemployed persons by duration of unemployment, US 2007-2013 
Numbers are seasonally adjusted (BLS, 2014c) 
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Figure 3: U.S. Beveridge Curve: Dec. 2000 – June 2012 
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Figure 4: Variation in State Unemployment Rates compared to US Unemployment Rate (BLS) 
 
Black line = national unemployment rate, gray lines represent the 50 states (and District of Columbia) 
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Figure 5: Variation in MaxUI across States, 2003-2013 
 
Black line = National Sample Average, gray lines represent the 50 states (and District of Columbia) 
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